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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DAMAGES - UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - Loss OF PROFITS NOT
WITHIN CONTEMPLATION OF PARTIES IN SALE OF DIESEL ENGINE
TO CONTRACT CARRIER IN CLAIM FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 2-715.
Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin (Pa. 1963)
Defendant, Irwin, purchased a diesel tractor engine from Keystone to
be installed in a tractor for use in his business as a contract carrier. The
engine failed to operate properly and was repaired by Keystone without
cost. When the engine required subsequent repairs, Irwin orally agreed
to pay for the work. In an action in assumpsit brought. by Keystone for the
defendant's refusal to pay, the latter counterclaimed for loss of profit based
on his inability to use the engine for twenty-seven days due to the seller's
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The lower court struck off
the counterclaim and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the loss of profits thus occasioned was not within the contemplation of
the parties. Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d
376 (1963).
There is no question that the line of authority preceding this case
allows no recovery for consequential damages not contemplated by the
parties. The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is too well settled:
[I] f these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party
breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by
any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.1
The Pennsylvania cases cited 2 in the opinion all follow the rule that:
"... compensation is given for only those injuries that the defendant had
reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was
made." 3 However, it is of importance to note that no case cited in the
Keystone opinion was decided under the Uniform Commercial Code of
Pennsylvania, 4 nor made any mention of it.
The Code provides that the measure of damages for breach of war-
ranty "is the difference . . . between the value of the goods as accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as Warranted. ... 5
It also provides for additional damages resulting from general or particular
requirements or needs of the buyer which are shown to have been within
1. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
2. Adams v. Speckman, 385 Pa. 308, 122 A.2d 685 (1956) (the action arose prior
to the effective date of the Code); Taylor v. Kaufhold, 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347(1951) ; Macchio v. Megow, 355 Pa. 565, 50 A.2d 314 (1947) ; Wolstenholme, Inc. v.
Jos. Randall & Bro., 295 Pa. 131, 144 At. 909 (1929).
3. IZSTATXM4NT, CONTRACrs § 330 (1932).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-714 (1963).
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the contemplation of the parties.6 Based solely on case law prior to the
enactment of the Code and without reference to the explanatory legislative
"comments," the court, interpreting these two sections, decided the loss of
profit was not within that contemplation. It is singularly important to note
that this is one of the few instances of the use of the Code by the court
without the aid of the comments.7
In 1953 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted into law the Code as
promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and adopted the comments
following each section. These comments and annotations, prepared by the
several drafting committees, were to be among the "more significant" 8
aids to proper construction of the various sections. Many courts9 are using
them and while there is some controversy over the extent of their use
and the weight to be given them, it seems to be universally accepted that
at least they are to be used as aids in determining what result the drafters
intended to achieve.'0 Even New York, which refused to adopt the Code
section" recommending their use to aid in construction "for fear that the
courts would place undue emphasis on the comments,"'1 2 conceded that
. . . existing principles of statutory construction would in any event
permit recourse to the comments to resolve ambiguities ... ,,'s Pennsyl-
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-715(2) (1963) reads as follows:
Consequential damages resulting from seller's breach include (a) any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller
at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably
be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proxi-
mately resulting from any breach of warranty.
7. D4L DUcA & KING, COMMERCIAL CoDE LITIGATION (1961) includes every re-
ported Pennsylvania case as of December 1960, in which the Code (effective since
1954) was mentioned. In that span of'six years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
referred to the Code in only six opinions. In three of these, the cases arose prior to
the Code. In every instance in which the Code was controlling, the court cited
the comments in support of their ruling.
8. See Merrill, Uniformly Correct Construction of Uniform Laws, 49 A.B.A.J.
545, 547 (1963). The author states that the comments are "the more significant aids"
to proper construction and also sees "heartening signs" (in the following cases and in
others) that the habit of consulting the official comments is becoming an established
practice. In re Eton Furniture Co., 286 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Industrial Packaging
Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960)
Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
9. See e.g., cases cited, supra note 8.
10. Note, The Uniform Commercial Code: Major Differences Between Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania, 71 HARV. L. Rgv. 674, 686 (1958). In discussing the use
of the comments to the Code, the author said:
Since the new comments for the revised UCC had not been completed by
the time Massachusetts enacted the Code, there was no choice but to omit refer-
ence to the comments, since the old ones were clearly obsolete. The comments
will undoubtedly remain a legitimate source of legislative history for the Massa-
chusetts Code, although they may not be given as persuasive an effect as in
Pennsylvania. (Footnote omitted.)
11. Section 1-102(3) (f) reads as follows:
In construing and applying this act to effect its purposes the following rules
shall apply: . . . (f) The Comments of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be con-
sulted in the construction and application of this Act but if text and comments
conflict, text controls.
12. Note, supra note 10, at 686.
13. LAW REvIsIoN COMMISSION, RZPORT RMLATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, N.Y. LXG. Doc. No. 65(A) (1956).
[VOL. 9
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/11
FRECENT DEVELOPMENTS
vania, in the interest of uniformity,1 4 omitted that section from its 1959
version in view of the fact that "existing principles of statutory construction"
already adopted by the legislature 15 made that section superfluous. In this
light, the refusal of the court in the instant case to use the comments in
applying section 2-715 is surprising.
In deciding whether or not the defendant's counterclaim was properly
stricken as a matter of law, its allegations were assumed to be true. Thus
the issue was ". . . whether the damages sought for loss of profit were
within the contemplation of the parties to the contract here in dispute."'"
Comment 3 to section 2-715 reads in part as follows:
. . . the seller is liable for consequential damages in all cases where
he had reason to know of the buyer's general or particular require-
ments at the time of contracting. It is not necessary that there be a
conscious acceptance of an insurer's liability on the seller's part ...
Particular needs of the buyer must generally be made known to
the seller while general needs must rarely be made known, to charge
the seller with knowledge. (Emphasis added.)
The question to be immediately answered is whether the loss of profits
here alleged flows from the "general needs" of the purchaser. The de-
fendant was a contract carrier and known as such to the seller. It is obvious
that the buyer would put the engine to use in his business. In this situ-
ation it is illogical and unreasonable to say that the seller did not at least
contemplate the possibility that if the engine did not work, the purchaser
would suffer production loss as well as loss of the value of the engine. The
court admits: "there is no doubt that ... a breach causing malfunction of
the engine would produce a halt in productive capacity and damage could
flow therefrom."'1 7 In light of this admission and the reasoning stated
above, it is difficult to see how the court can say as a matter of law that
this damage was not in the contemplation of the parties.
Another deficiency of Irwin's case according to the court was his
failure to allege facts which would put Keystone on guard that he would
hold it responsible for any loss of profit from his inability to use the engine
in question. However, if this loss is the natural result of the breach, no
such statement is required. If the possibility of loss were within the con-
templation of the parties, specific statements of intention to affix liability
for the loss would be mere surplusage.
14. Merrill, supra note 8, at 547:
For a variety of reasons, this provision was eliminated. One of the best rea-
sons was that, because of the line of authorities already cited, this sort of pro-
vision is unnecessary surplusage. It is to be hoped that the judges will form
the habit of consulting the official comments whenever they are confronted with a
problem of construction under the Code.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 551-66 (1952).
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To show that loss of profit on subsequent contracts should not be
charged to the seller, the court relies on Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co.' 8 which extends"9 the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. The
case disallows recovery for loss of profit on "completely unrelated business
contracts." The loss involved in that case was due to carrier's breach of
contract through failure to deliver,20 a situation clearly distinguishable
from the sale of machinery by a manufacturer who knows the needs of his
purchaser, because of the different warranties involved. The case required
that "knowledge must be brought home to the party sought to be charged," 2'
while the Code, speaking through the comments insists that ". . . general
needs must rarely be made known to charge the seller with knowledge. '22
(Emphasis added.)
This language would place any loss of profit due to Keystone's breach
within the general needs of the defendant, and hence, within Keystone's
contemplation. The court readily admits the productive loss and the damage
which follows. Profit is a natural consequence of productivity. What
great step is it from loss of productive capacity to loss of profit? The
latter should flow naturally and probably from the former.
Williston suggests that losses will be within the contemplation of the
parties if seller knows the nature of the buyer's business without more.28
Loss of profit from subsequent or collateral contracts is to be allowed
whether or not the subsequent contract actually existed so long as the
probability of resale (or use of machinery) was known.24 Therefore it
should not have been necessary for the defendant to allege any facts which
would apprise plaintiff of the fact that defendant would hold him respon-
sible for the inability to use the engine.
The court states that applying defendant's theory, whenever such a
motor vehicle is sold for use in a profit motivated enterprise, the seller
may be liable for loss of profit due to breach of warranty resulting from
"completely unrelated contracts." Logic does not compel such a conclusion,
nor does the Code contemplate such a result. Whenever an engine or a
motor vehicle is sold, its sole purpose is its "productive capacity." It is
not purchased for stock or as an asset to be owned for its "value as
warranted" per se. Its value is its usefulness to the buyer. The "general
needs" (of which the Code holds the seller must be aware) are not "un-
related contracts." Any manufacturer-seller today is aware of the effects of
potential sub-par merchandise or performance and is prepared to sustain
18. 190 U.S. 540, 23 S.Ct. 754 (1903).
19. WILLISTON, SALES § 599b (1948).
20. In fact, the language of the Globe case quoted by the Pennsylvania court is
itself a quote by Mr. Justice Holmes of Mr. Justice Willes in British Columbia &
V. I. Spar, Lumber, & Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, [1868] 3 C.P. 499, 500, another
carrier case.
21. 190 U.S. 540, 545, 23 S.Ct. 754, 756.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-715, Comment 3 (1963).
23. WILLISTON, SALES § 599d (1948).
24. Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1941); Fair-
banks, Morse & Co. v. Austin, 288 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1923) ; Dally v. Isaacson, 40
Wash.2d 574, 245 P.2d 200 (1952) ; MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 175 (1935).
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